Reclaiming Yorkshire: A Blueprint for True Local Power and a Decentralized UK

Disclaimer

This article includes insights and analysis generated with the assistance of an experimental AI. While efforts have been made to ensure factual accuracy, readers are encouraged to cross-reference information from multiple reputable sources.

For too long, the political landscape of the United Kingdom has been defined by a suffocating centralisation of power in Westminster. Decisions made hundreds of miles away, by politicians often disconnected from the realities of our communities, dictate the fate of regions like Yorkshire. This is not merely an inefficiency; it is a systemic flaw, exacerbated by an outdated electoral system, that demonstrably stifles local representation, undermines regional development, and breeds a pervasive sense of democratic disenfranchisement. The aggressive resistance from central government to genuinely decentralize power is not a passive oversight but an active perpetuation of a system that benefits a distant elite, often at the expense of regional vitality. Here at the Yorkshire Popular Front, we believe it’s time to fundamentally rethink how power is distributed, starting from the ground up and extending to a truly decentralized Britain, despite the entrenched opposition.

The Case for Proportional Representation in Local Councils: Ending the Electoral Lottery

The Problem: The Distorting Lens of First Past the Post (FPTP)

The First Past the Post (FPTP) system, which governs local council elections in England and Wales, is not merely outdated; it is a democratic anachronism, fundamentally flawed and ill-suited for contemporary multi-party politics. Designed to sustain a system dominated by two major parties, its application in an era of diversifying political preferences yields chaotic and unpredictable outcomes, as voters increasingly express dissatisfaction with traditional political establishments (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 1).

The inherent disproportionality of FPTP is a glaring affront to fairness, evident in the stark contrast between vote shares and seat allocations. Recent local elections illustrate this vividly: Reform UK secured 41% of seats despite polling only 31% of the vote, while Labour, with a 14% vote share, obtained a mere 6% of seats. Conversely, the Liberal Democrats, with 17% of the vote, surprisingly outperformed the Conservatives (23% vote share) by winning 23% of seats compared to the Conservatives’ 19% (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 1). Such disparities are not statistical anomalies; they are a fundamental breakdown of the system’s ability to accurately reflect the electorate’s collective will. This distortion is not uniform, but arbitrary, a geographical lottery where similar levels of support can result in vastly different political power, undermining the very principle of equal votes. Reform UK’s vote share was five points higher in Cambridgeshire than in Oxfordshire, yet its seat return in Cambridgeshire was eight times greater. Similarly, a 33% vote share in Leicestershire translated into 46% of seats, while a slightly higher 37% in Derbyshire yielded a disproportionate 66% of seats (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 2).

In Yorkshire, the consequences of FPTP are directly observable, a bitter pill for local democracy. The election of the new York & North Yorkshire mayor, David Skaith, with just 35.1% of the vote, exemplifies how candidates can win significant positions with the support of a minority of the electorate. This outcome means that nearly two-thirds of voters did not directly endorse the winning candidate, diminishing the democratic mandate and potentially fostering a profound sense of disenfranchisement among the majority (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 2).

Beyond numerical distortions, FPTP actively stifles diverse voices and relentlessly reduces accountability. The system inherently suppresses political diversity, erecting formidable barriers for smaller parties, independent candidates, and grassroots movements to gain meaningful representation. It favors geographically concentrated support, rendering votes for parties or candidates with broader but less localized appeal effectively “wasted.” This phenomenon is widespread, with 57.8% of voters in the 2024 general election being unrepresented because their preferred candidate did not win. The unequal value of votes, where it took an average of 23,500 votes for Labour to win a seat compared to over 820,000 per Reform MP in 2024, compels tactical voting. Voters are often forced to choose a candidate they do not genuinely prefer, merely to prevent a less desired outcome, further eroding the authenticity of representation and voter engagement (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 2). The system’s design also concentrates power within major parties, leading to reduced accountability. FPTP creates “safe seats” where election outcomes are largely predetermined, allowing politicians to rely on party loyalty rather than active representation of diverse local needs. In Yorkshire, this manifests in areas like North Yorkshire being reliably Conservative, while South Yorkshire remains historically Labour-leaning. This dynamic can lead to a lamentable lack of responsiveness from elected officials, as their re-election is often secured regardless of their performance or engagement with the broader electorate. This also reinforces “regional fiefdoms,” where one party dominates, effectively silencing minority voices within those regions and exaggerating perceived social and geographical divisions (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 2). The increasing prevalence of “no overall control” in local councils—161 in Great Britain in 2025, a significant increase from 145 in 2024—signals a growing voter dissatisfaction with traditional party dominance and the system’s inability to produce clear majorities (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 2). While this might appear to introduce diversity, it often results from fragmented vote shares that the FPTP system struggles to translate into stable governance, leading to complex coalition negotiations and potential instability.

The Solution: A Proposed Two-House Local Council System under Mixed-Member Proportional Representation (MMPR)

To fundamentally address the systemic distortions and democratic deficits inherent in the current FPTP system at the local level, a novel Mixed-Member Proportional Representation (MMPR) system is proposed for local councils in Yorkshire. This innovative structure, featuring two distinct houses, aims to combine the benefits of proportional representation with robust independent and local accountability, thereby fostering a more truly representative and dynamic local democracy.

House 1: Party-List Proportional Representation (PR) for Party-Aligned Representatives The first house of the local council would be elected via Party-List Proportional Representation. In this system, voters would cast a single vote for their preferred political party. Seats in this house would then be allocated proportionally to the total party votes received across multi-member districts, ensuring that the political composition of the council accurately reflects the overall party preferences of the electorate. Parties would present pre-ordered lists of candidates (closed lists), or the system could allow voters to influence the order of candidates within a party’s list (open lists), providing flexibility in candidate selection. To ensure precise proportionality, various apportionment methods, such as the Sainte-Laguë method (known for being generally unbiased) or the Hare quota, could be employed. Electoral thresholds could be set to prevent excessive fragmentation, ensuring a workable number of parties are represented. The primary benefits of this house include a significant reduction in disproportionality and “wasted votes,” as every vote contributes to a party’s overall seat share. This fosters multi-party legislatures, encouraging political parties to develop broader, more appealing policy platforms to maximize their vote share, which can lead to more collaborative and consensus-driven governance. Moreover, this system inherently diminishes the opportunity for gerrymandering, as seats are allocated proportionally across larger multi-member districts, making it considerably more challenging to manipulate boundaries for partisan advantage (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 4).

House 2: Independent Representatives Elected via Schulze Single Transferable Vote (STV) The second house would be uniquely composed entirely of independent candidates, ensuring a dedicated space for non-partisan voices. Voters would cast a single transferable vote by ranking individual candidates by name in carefully managed multi-member constituencies. The Schulze STV method would be the chosen mechanism for this house. This multi-winner ranked-choice system is particularly noted for its resistance to tactical voting and its ability to elect a Condorcet winner—a candidate who would defeat every other candidate in a head-to-head contest (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 4). A critical rule would be that candidates are prohibited from appearing on a party list for House 1 and simultaneously running as an independent for House 2, ensuring a clear and uncompromised distinction between the two chambers. This independent house would establish a direct and robust link between representatives and their local constituents, directly addressing the “severed link” often observed under FPTP. It would provide a genuine pathway for diverse, non-party voices and grassroots movements to gain representation, even without the backing of traditional party machinery. The STV mechanism ensures that votes are not “wasted,” as voter preferences are transferred if a candidate is elected with a surplus or eliminated, maximizing the impact of each ballot. This design fosters greater voter engagement and allows for the election of individuals based on their merit, local appeal, and specific community advocacy, rather than strict adherence to party lines (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 4).

This dual-chamber MMPR system offers a synergistic approach to representation and governance, creating a more dynamic and responsive local democracy for Yorkshire. Firstly, it ensures true representation and competition by providing both broad ideological proportionality (via Party-List PR in House 1) and granular, community-level representation (via Schulze STV for independents in House 2). This creates a dynamic where political parties are incentivized to appeal broadly across the region, while independent representatives can focus intensely on specific local issues and advocate for distinct community needs. This structure fosters genuine competition, even for smaller political entities and diverse viewpoints that are often marginalized under FPTP. The Condorcet property of Schulze STV ensures that the most broadly preferred independent candidates are elected, further legitimizing their role and enhancing their capacity to represent community consensus (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 5).

Secondly, the system is optimized against gerrymandering. While Party-List PR inherently reduces the impact of boundary manipulation by allocating seats proportionally across larger multi-member districts, the multi-member constituencies of STV further mitigate this risk. By ensuring that substantial minority groups can elect representatives within these districts, regardless of how boundaries might be drawn to favor one party in a single-member contest, the system dilutes the effectiveness of gerrymandering. This structural resilience protects the integrity of local representation from partisan manipulation (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 5).

Thirdly, it leads to increased politician accountability. Representatives elected through Party-List PR are accountable for their party’s overall platform and performance across the region, encouraging them to pursue broadly appealing policies. Concurrently, independent representatives elected via Schulze STV are directly accountable to their constituents for their individual actions, local advocacy, and responsiveness to specific community concerns. This dual accountability mechanism ensures that politicians in both houses are incentivized to work diligently to represent their constituents, as their success depends on different but complementary forms of public support. This moves beyond the “safe seat” phenomenon under FPTP, where accountability can be weak due to predetermined outcomes (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 5). Finally, the existence of two distinct houses, each with its own mandate and electoral logic, fosters genuine collaboration and compromise for legislation to pass. This prevents any single party or bloc from dominating local governance and compels negotiation between party-aligned and independent representatives. The requirement for cross-house consensus encourages a more consensual approach to policy-making, leading to more robust, widely supported, and nuanced local decisions that truly reflect the diverse interests of Yorkshire’s communities. This fundamental governmental restructuring at the local level would create a more robust and responsive democracy (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 5).

The effective implementation of Schulze STV for the independent house relies heavily on the careful design of multi-member constituencies. The district magnitude, which refers to the number of members to be elected in each constituency, is a crucial determinant of the system’s proportionality. While larger districts generally lead to greater proportionality by allowing smaller groups to elect representatives, a balance is necessary to maintain a recognizable local link and ensure representatives remain connected to their communities. Academic consensus suggests that districts with three to seven seats tend to perform effectively, with odd numbers (3, 5, or 7) often preferred. This range allows for diverse representation while maintaining a manageable constituency size, ensuring that a meaningful proportion of the electorate can elect a candidate of their choice. Boundary design is equally important. Constituencies should be drawn to align with “natural, administrative and locally recognised boundaries” (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 5-6). This approach helps preserve community identity and ensures that representatives are genuinely connected to the areas they serve, rather than serving artificially constructed electoral units. The inherent flexibility of STV in geographic boundaries can also enhance accessibility and representation for dispersed populations within Yorkshire. From the voter’s perspective, the STV ballot is no more complicated than other forms of ranked-choice voting, requiring voters to rank candidates by preference (1, 2, 3, etc.). While the underlying calculation process for Schulze STV is computationally more complex than traditional STV, often requiring computer assistance, the voter experience remains straightforward and intuitive (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 6).

The Illusion of Local Power: How Westminster Undermines Devolution in Yorkshire

The Problem: Central Government’s Hampering of Devolution Initiatives

Despite the persistent rhetoric surrounding initiatives like “Northern Powerhouse” and “Levelling Up,” current devolution efforts in the UK, particularly within Yorkshire, are widely perceived as largely symbolic or “false promises.” This perception stems from a consistent pattern of central government retaining significant control, providing insufficient funding, and maintaining key legislative powers, thereby rendering local efforts largely ineffective. This is not benign neglect; it is an active and aggressive resistance to genuine regional autonomy, driven by a deeply ingrained tradition of Westminster centralisation.

The “Levelling Up” agenda, despite its stated ambition to address regional disparities, has faced considerable criticism for its centralized management and inadequate financial backing. Reports indicate that the funds allocated were “thinly spread,” overly focused on infrastructure projects directed by central government, and lacked clear success criteria, making it difficult to assess their true impact. A government watchdog, the Industrial Strategy Council, explicitly noted that these plans were “insufficient and centrally managed, rather than being controlled by regions” (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 7). Further scrutiny revealed a concerning pattern of “pork barrel politics” in the allocation of “Levelling Up” funds. Analysis by the Financial Times indicated that the methodology used to determine funding ignored standard poverty indicators, instead classifying wealthier, Conservative-voting areas as “priority one” regions, often ahead of more deprived Labour-voting areas. This was corroborated by The Guardian, which found that Conservative-run local authorities received significantly higher per capita grants (£93) compared to Labour-run ones (£65) (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 7). Such findings strongly suggest that funding decisions were politically motivated rather than genuinely needs-based, severely undermining the credibility and effectiveness of the entire initiative.

Yorkshire, a key target for “Levelling Up,” has experienced direct financial erosion due to central government policies. North Yorkshire, a significant part of the region, has already lost £14 million from the Rural Services Delivery Grant, and projections indicate an additional £27 million annual loss from the government’s “fair funding review.” Local leaders have vocally criticized this, describing it as “taking money off rural areas and putting into urban areas,” characterizing it as a “ruthless way to shift monies.” This directly translates into tangible cuts to essential local services, including social care, support for children with special needs, and critical road maintenance, exacerbating issues like the pervasive problem of potholes, which disproportionately affect rural areas with extensive road networks (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 7).

Adding to the financial constraints, the proposed 100% council tax equalisation would further centralize financial control. This measure would offset a council’s full tax base when determining its funding, effectively transferring money from areas with a relatively high council tax base, such as North Yorkshire, to those with a lower base. This policy not only disincentivizes local efforts to grow the tax base but also met with limited support, with only one in four councils backing the approach in previous consultations (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 8). Broader trends in council funding across the UK reveal a staggering £11.3 billion cut since 2010, leading to the loss of over 500,000 council jobs and significant reductions in vital services such as parks, children’s centers, and youth services. These cuts disproportionately impact vulnerable populations and reduce the money circulating within local economies, creating a downward spiral in employment prospects (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 8).

Westminster’s continued retention of key legislative powers and the resulting financial dependency further illustrate the superficiality of current devolution. While Combined Authorities (CAs) and Mayoral Strategic Authorities (MSAs) have been established in parts of Yorkshire, such as Hull and East Yorkshire, and are gaining some powers over transport and skills funding, central government frequently imposes “detailed and specific targets” across these and other areas, including housing, net zero, and business support. This means that even where powers are ostensibly devolved, the central government dictates the parameters and objectives. Mayoral strategic authorities remain “largely dependent on central government grants,” with minimal additional revenue-raising powers beyond a small precept on council tax. This profound financial dependency means that local efforts, even when well-intentioned, are often rendered ineffective due to budgetary constraints and central mandates. The UK’s sub-national revenue autonomy, at 35%, is significantly lower than the EU average of 53%, starkly highlighting this dependency and perpetuating the perception that current devolution is a “false promise” (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 8). This financial stranglehold is the most significant barrier to “true local power” in Yorkshire, fostering significant frustration and undermining efforts to address deep-seated regional inequalities.

The underlying issue is Westminster’s deeply ingrained tradition of centralized policymaking, which operates on the flawed assumption of “homogenous needs across regions.” This approach has directly contributed to persistent interregional economic disparities, particularly between northern and southern England, which are among the most severe in developed countries. A top-down approach inevitably limits the effectiveness of place-based initiatives, as central government lacks the granular understanding necessary to effectively micromanage or respond to local complexities and unique needs. The frequent “churn” of these policies further indicates a lack of long-term commitment and stability, which is essential for effective regional development (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 8).

The Solution: Pathways to Enhanced Devolution and Decentralization

Achieving genuine local power in Yorkshire necessitates a fundamental departure from Westminster’s current “deal-based” and financially dependent model. A systemic shift towards granting substantial legislative and fiscal autonomy is required, drawing valuable lessons from successful international examples of decentralized governance within unitary states. This transition, though aggressively resisted by central government, is essential to unlock Yorkshire’s full potential.

For Yorkshire, this would translate into the transfer of full legislative control over critical regional policy domains. This includes the ability to set regional planning policies, manage and develop transport networks, formulate and implement economic development strategies, establish local environmental policies, and exercise genuine authority over key public services like education and healthcare. This moves beyond the current limited “oversight” or “coordination” roles typically granted to Combined Authorities, empowering Yorkshire to legislate for its own distinct future (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 10).

Genuine legislative power is intrinsically linked to and contingent upon fiscal autonomy. The prevailing UK model, where a vast majority (95%) of tax revenues are collected centrally and then redistributed via grants, must undergo fundamental reform. This financial reliance means that even when legislative powers are nominally transferred, the central government retains ultimate authority through the “power of the purse.” Budget cuts, funding reviews that redistribute resources away from certain areas, and the absence of robust local revenue-raising powers directly constrain local councils’ ability to act independently and effectively. This fiscal centralization undermines the “social contract” between local government and its citizens, as accountability shifts upwards to the funding source rather than downwards to the local taxpayer. It stifles local innovation and the development of tailored solutions for public services, as local authorities are compelled to prioritize adherence to central funding criteria over unique regional needs (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 8).

Key mechanisms for enhanced regional fiscal control in Yorkshire would include:

• Regional Income Tax: Following the precedent set by Scotland, Yorkshire should be empowered to set its own income tax band thresholds and rates on non-savings and non-dividend income for its residents. This would provide a substantial, flexible, and locally-accountable revenue stream directly tied to the region’s economic performance and population’s prosperity, fostering a direct link between regional governance and local economic health (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 10).
• Full Control Over Business Rates: Instead of the current system where local authorities retain only 50% of business rates and are subject to complex redistribution mechanisms, Yorkshire should have the authority to fully retain all business rates collected within its jurisdiction. Reforms should include replacing the current fixed yield system with a fixed rate, conducting more frequent property valuations (ideally annually or biennially) to ensure accuracy and fairness, and extending reset periods to provide greater predictability for long-term regional financial planning. This would significantly increase the financial rewards available from supporting local economic growth (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 15-16).
• Enhanced Council Tax Powers: Local authorities in Yorkshire should gain the freedom to raise council tax rates without requiring central government referendums. Additionally, they should be empowered to introduce additional council tax bands to better reflect local property values and economic conditions, ensuring local taxation is more responsive to regional wealth and needs (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 16).
• Regional Sales Tax and Other Local Levies: Empowering Yorkshire to levy new local taxes, such as a regional sales tax or a tourism tax, would provide additional revenue streams tailored to specific regional economic activities. Such taxes are common in many European countries and US states, demonstrating their feasibility and effectiveness as local revenue generators. The ability to introduce environmental taxes could also provide both revenue and policy tools for sustainability (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 16).

Lessons from Germany and Spain underscore the viability of these fiscal decentralization mechanisms. Germany’s Länder collect the vast majority of taxes within their territories, and Spain’s Autonomous Communities possess the power to collect and regulate their main tax sources. These models demonstrate that significant tax collection and setting powers can be decentralized effectively within a unitary framework, fostering genuine budget-making autonomy at the regional level (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 11). Spain, for instance, is a highly decentralized unitary state where its Autonomous Communities have been granted extensive legislative and financial powers. Some, like the Basque Country and Navarre, operate under a “concerted taxes” system, allowing them to collect and regulate their main tax sources (e.g., income tax, VAT) and then pay a fixed amount to the central government for national functions (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 12). This provides a high degree of fiscal and legislative autonomy, enabling these regions to manage their own budgets and priorities with considerable independence.

Beyond the Ballot Box: Why Electoral Reform Alone Won’t Fix the System

The Problem: Limitations of National Electoral Reform without Fundamental Decentralization

While electoral reform, particularly the adoption of a proportional representation (PR) system at the national level, is a crucial step towards a more representative democracy, it alone cannot fully address the deep-seated issues of centralization in the United Kingdom. A proportionally elected Parliament, even one that accurately reflects the national vote share, could still result in distant decision-making and a pervasive lack of genuine regional understanding.

The UK has historically been one of the most centralized countries in the Western world, with Westminster politics and Whitehall bureaucracy deeply ingrained in almost every aspect of public life. This centralized model of public service delivery has been “tested to destruction,” leading to a lack of excellence and proving both ineffective and expensive due to attempts to micromanage services from the centre (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 13). Even with a more proportional Parliament, the inherent tendency of central government to retain and exert power would likely persist. Ministers and civil servants, accustomed to a top-down approach, might continue to believe that “many of the key decisions can only be made centrally,” particularly concerning interest rates, taxation policy, and major infrastructure investments. This aggressive clinging to power prevents genuine regional empowerment.

This centralization means that a proportionally elected Parliament could still suffer from a significant disconnect from the diverse needs and realities of regions like Yorkshire. It is inherently “impossible for the centre to truly understand, let alone micromanage, what happens in schools, hospitals, town halls and police stations across the country” (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 13). Decisions made in Westminster, even by a more proportionally representative body, would likely continue to be based on a generalized, often homogenous, understanding of national needs, rather than the nuanced, specific requirements of local communities. This can lead to insufficient consultation with diverse local needs, as central policy frameworks struggle to accommodate regional variations. Furthermore, economic prosperity itself is deeply dependent on local factors, including land use, transport connections, and the availability of public goods and services. The people and businesses within local economies are best placed to understand their unique strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, if a proportionally elected Parliament were to maintain control over these critical local policy decisions—such as education, policing, transport, and especially planning—it would continue to hinder the ability of regions to unlock their full potential and tailor development to their specific contexts. Electoral reform alone, without a corresponding and fundamental dispersal of legislative and fiscal powers, risks merely creating a more representative central government that remains distant and unresponsive to the genuine needs of its diverse regions. The problem is not just who is elected, but where power resides.

The Solution: A Proposed Two-House National System under Mixed-Member Proportional Representation (MMPR)

To truly decentralize power and ensure both national proportionality and robust regional and independent representation, a two-house national system under Mixed-Member Proportional Representation (MMPR) is proposed. This model fundamentally restructures governmental power, moving beyond mere electoral reform to foster a more responsive and collaborative democracy, directly challenging the central government’s entrenched resistance.

House 1: Party-List Proportional Representation (PR) for National Party Representation The first national house, equivalent to the current House of Commons, would be elected via Party-List Proportional Representation. In this system, voters would cast their ballots primarily for political parties, and seats would be allocated proportionally to the total party votes received across the national electorate. This ensures that the composition of the primary legislative chamber accurately reflects the national distribution of political support, significantly reducing the disproportionality and “wasted votes” inherent in the current FPTP system. The outcome would be a multi-party parliament that more genuinely represents the diverse ideological landscape of the UK (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 14).

House 2: Independent Candidates Elected via Schulze Single Transferable Vote (STV) A second national house, which could be a reformed House of Lords or an entirely new chamber, would be composed exclusively of independent candidates. These independents would be elected by name using the Schulze Single Transferable Vote (STV) method in carefully managed multi-member constituencies across the country. As with the local model, candidates would be strictly prohibited from simultaneously appearing on a party list for House 1 and running as an independent for House 2, ensuring the integrity and non-partisan nature of this chamber. This house would provide a direct conduit for local and regional concerns to reach the national legislative arena, ensuring that decisions are informed by a deeper understanding of diverse community needs (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 14).

This unique two-house national model offers several profound benefits that would fundamentally restructure governance and foster a more robust and responsive democracy:

• Prevents Complete Party Control: By having two chambers elected on different principles—one reflecting party proportionality and the other empowering independent, locally-rooted voices—no single party or coalition could unilaterally dominate the national agenda. This internal check and balance would necessitate broader consensus for legislation to pass, ensuring laws are more widely supported and less prone to partisan overreach.
• Mitigates “Cult of Personality”: In a system requiring cross-house consensus, the legislative process would become less reliant on the charisma or dictates of individual party leaders. Instead, it would compel genuine debate and negotiation between representatives from different electoral mandates, fostering a more deliberative and less centralized form of governance.
• Ensures Broader Representation: The independent chamber, elected by STV, would provide a powerful platform for diverse interests, minority viewpoints, and non-partisan expertise that might otherwise struggle to gain traction within a party-dominated system. This ensures that the national legislature is more reflective of the multifaceted nature of society, rather than just party political divisions.
• Necessitates Collaboration: The requirement for legislation to pass through two distinct chambers would compel genuine collaboration and compromise, leading to more thoroughly debated and robust laws, as different perspectives and mandates would have to be reconciled. This collaborative dynamic would foster a culture of consensus-building rather than adversarial politics.
• Fundamental Governmental Restructuring: This structure would decentralize power not just through voting, but through a fundamental governmental restructuring, fostering a more robust and responsive democracy. By distributing legislative authority across two chambers with distinct electoral bases and mandates, the national government would become more attuned to diverse public interests and less susceptible to control by powerful, narrow interests. This inherent governmental restructuring would ensure that the national legislative process is more inclusive, deliberative, and ultimately more legitimate in the eyes of the populace (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 14-15).

The Practical Utopian: A Blueprint for a Truly Decentralized UK

The failures of the current centralized system, as highlighted in previous sections, underscore the urgent need for a transformative shift towards genuine regional autonomy. This section outlines a concrete blueprint for substantial decentralization, empowering regions like Yorkshire to control their own destinies across key policy domains, despite the aggressive resistance from central government to relinquish control.

The Solution: Concrete Decentralization Blueprint for Regions like Yorkshire

Achieving true local power for regions like Yorkshire requires moving beyond token devolution deals to a comprehensive framework of substantial autonomy. This blueprint outlines practical proposals across fiscal, economic, environmental, infrastructure, and public service domains, drawing on successful international precedents.

Fiscal Autonomy: Genuine regional autonomy is fundamentally dependent on the ability to raise and retain a significant proportion of local taxes, thereby controlling regional budgets independently of central government. The current UK model, where 95% of tax revenues are collected centrally, creates an unsustainable financial dependency (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 15). This fiscal centralization undermines the “social contract” between local government and its citizens, as accountability shifts upwards to the funding source rather than downwards to the local taxpayer. It stifles local innovation and the development of tailored solutions for public services, as local authorities are compelled to prioritize adherence to central funding criteria over unique regional needs (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 8). For Yorkshire, mechanisms for enhanced fiscal autonomy would include:

• Regional Income Tax: Following the precedent set by Scotland, Yorkshire should be empowered to set its own income tax band thresholds and rates on non-savings and non-dividend income for its residents. This would provide a substantial, flexible, and locally-accountable revenue stream directly tied to the region’s economic performance and population’s prosperity, fostering a direct link between regional governance and local economic health (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 10).
• Full Control Over Business Rates: Instead of the current system where local authorities retain only 50% of business rates and are subject to complex redistribution mechanisms, Yorkshire should have the authority to fully retain all business rates collected within its jurisdiction. Reforms should include replacing the current fixed yield system with a fixed rate, conducting more frequent property valuations (ideally annually or biennially) to ensure accuracy and fairness, and extending reset periods to provide greater predictability for long-term regional financial planning. This would significantly increase the financial rewards available from supporting local economic growth (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 15-16).
• Enhanced Council Tax Powers: Local authorities in Yorkshire should gain the freedom to raise council tax rates without requiring central government referendums. Additionally, they should be empowered to introduce additional council tax bands to better reflect local property values and economic conditions, ensuring local taxation is more responsive to regional wealth and needs (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 16).
• Regional Sales Tax and Other Local Levies: Empowering Yorkshire to levy new local taxes, such as a regional sales tax or a tourism tax, would provide additional revenue streams tailored to specific regional economic activities. Such taxes are common in many European countries and US states, demonstrating their feasibility and effectiveness as local revenue generators. The ability to introduce environmental taxes could also provide both revenue and policy tools for promoting sustainable practices (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 16).

Industrial and Economic Control: Granting regions control over their industrial strategies is crucial for fostering local industries aligned with regional strengths and environmental goals. The centralized approach, assuming homogenous needs, has contributed to severe interregional economic disparities, particularly between northern and southern England, which are among the most severe in developed countries (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 8).

• Strategic Planning and Diversification: Regions with a legacy of “old industries,” such as parts of Yorkshire impacted by de-industrialization (e.g., Wakefield and Castleford), require tailored strategies for reconversion and economic diversification. This involves building on existing regional capacities to cultivate new businesses in sectors like green energy, advanced manufacturing, and agriculture, rather than relying on a narrow industrial base (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 16).
• Integrated Territorial Investment (ITI): Models from Europe, such as the EU’s Integrated Territorial Investment (ITI) framework, demonstrate how designated territories can develop integrated development strategies and manage substantial funds from various thematic objectives. This enables urban areas, like Leeds and Manchester, to establish specific strategies for growth sectors (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 16).
• Public-Private Partnerships and Local Action: Successful regional economic planning, as seen in Manchester, Essen, Lille, and Bilbao, relies on strong administrative cooperation, public-private partnerships, and local action plans. Yorkshire could adopt similar approaches, with its Combined Authorities gaining full authority to develop and implement regional economic strategies, attract investment, and support innovation, moving beyond centrally imposed targets (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 16-17).

Environmental Stewardship: Decentralizing environmental policy allows for tailored approaches that are more attuned to specific local needs and ecological conditions, fostering greater accountability and participation.

• Localized Policy Development: Regions should have greater power over local environmental policies, including sustainable land management, flood prevention, and renewable energy projects. This allows for policies to be designed for specific regional ecologies and challenges, such as Yorkshire’s varied topography and flood risks (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 17).
• Water Resource Management: Decentralization could empower river basin authorities or local water management boards to make decisions about water usage, irrigation practices, and pollution control within their specific catchment areas, leading to more efficient and equitable water distribution (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 17).
• Renewable Energy Projects: Germany’s decentralized energy system, where local and regional levels have gained significant importance in expanding renewable energies, offers a compelling example. Citizen participation in local energy transitions has increased awareness and knowledge, fostering local value creation through jobs and tax revenues (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 17). Scotland’s devolved powers for environmental protection, climate change, pollution, waste management, and flood and coastal protection provide a UK-based precedent for such transfers (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 17).

Infrastructure Development: Decision-making for transport networks, digital connectivity, and public utilities can be effectively decentralized to ensure projects genuinely serve local needs, rather than being dictated by a distant central authority.

• Transport Networks: While the UK government’s Transport Decarbonisation Plan exists, clarity on local roles is needed. Regional authorities like the Hull and East Yorkshire Combined Authority are beginning to gain control over transport funding, allowing local leaders to improve public bus and rail services and roads based on regional priorities. Models like Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) in the US demonstrate how regional bodies, comprising local government and transportation agencies, can plan, design, and prioritize transportation infrastructure, channeling funding to serve metropolitan planning areas. Yorkshire needs similar authority over its road, rail, and public transport networks, including the ability to integrate services and address connectivity gaps like those between Bradford and Leeds or Sheffield and Barnsley (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 17).
• Digital Connectivity: Decentralized Physical Infrastructure Networks (DePINs) offer models for localized control over digital infrastructure. Examples like Helium, which built a decentralized 5G cellular network, illustrate how community-driven initiatives can provide cheaper and faster home internet by leveraging wireless links. European Digital Infrastructure Consortia (EDICs) provide a legal framework for Member States to set up and implement multi-country digital projects, allowing flexibility in governance and funding. Yorkshire could establish regional digital infrastructure consortia to drive broadband and 5G deployment tailored to its specific needs, ensuring widespread connectivity for businesses and residents (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 17).
• Public Utilities: The management of essential public utilities such as water, gas, electricity, and waste disposal can be decentralized to improve responsiveness to local populations. While some European countries have seen liberalization and privatization, semi-autonomous public utilities models exist where local and regional authorities maintain significant control. Belgian regions, for instance, have achieved substantial functional autonomy over economic development and agriculture, including the use of environmental taxes to fund environmental protection. Yorkshire could establish regional public utility boards with greater autonomy over service provision, infrastructure upgrades, and environmental standards, ensuring these essential services are managed in line with local priorities and accountability (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 18).

Tailored Public Services: Greater regional autonomy over the delivery and adaptation of public services like education and healthcare is vital for fostering innovative, locally-responsive models that genuinely meet the diverse needs of different communities within Yorkshire, rather than being constrained by a rigid national template.

• Healthcare: Semi-autonomous hospital models have proven reasonably successful across Europe, granting hospitals greater discretion in operational and strategic decisions, leading to improved responsiveness to local population needs (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform (2), p. 18). While the UK’s NHS operates on a Beveridge model (tax-funded, government-provided), Germany’s Bismarck model (social insurance funds, private providers) and Switzerland’s cantonal autonomy demonstrate how decentralized decision-making can lead to superior health outcomes and patient satisfaction, despite potential geographical disparities. For Yorkshire, this could mean regional health boards with significant control over budget allocation, service commissioning, and adaptation of care models to address specific health inequalities and demographic needs within the region, moving beyond a “one-size-fits-all” national template.
• Education: European education systems offer models where local communities or regions have significant control. In Germany, Länder have exclusive legislative powers over education and universities. This allows for educational policies and curricula to be tailored to regional economic needs and cultural contexts (Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform, p. 18). For Yorkshire, this would entail greater regional control over school funding, curriculum development, teacher training, and the establishment of educational institutions that align with local industry demands (e.g., advanced manufacturing, green technologies) and community values, fostering local talent pipelines and addressing specific educational attainment gaps.

Conclusion: Reclaiming Yorkshire’s Future Against Centralized Resistance

The current state of governance in the United Kingdom, characterized by a centralized Westminster and an electoral system that distorts local representation, has demonstrably hindered the potential of regions like Yorkshire. The analysis has shown how the First Past the Post system systematically misrepresents voter preferences, stifles diverse voices, and concentrates power, leading to a profound democratic deficit at the local level. Concurrently, central government initiatives, despite their stated aims, have often amounted to an “illusory devolution,” characterized by insufficient funding, retained legislative powers, and a pervasive financial dependency that prevents genuine local autonomy. This is not benign neglect; it is the aggressive resistance of a centralized power structure unwilling to relinquish its grip, even as the system it champions demonstrably fails the people it claims to serve.

The blueprint presented in this article offers a comprehensive and integrated pathway to true local power. By introducing a two-house Mixed-Member Proportional Representation system at both local and national levels, the proposal addresses the fundamental flaws of electoral distortion. The local two-house model, with its Party-List PR chamber for party-aligned representation and a Schulze STV chamber for independent voices, ensures both ideological proportionality and granular community-level accountability. This synergistic design fosters genuine competition, optimizes against gerrymandering, and necessitates collaboration, leading to more robust and representative local governance. Similarly, the proposed national two-house system would prevent complete party dominance, mitigate the “cult of personality,” and compel cross-chamber compromise, fundamentally restructuring governmental power to be more responsive to diverse public interests.

Crucially, this blueprint extends beyond electoral reform to advocate for substantial legislative and fiscal autonomy for regions like Yorkshire. Drawing lessons from successful unitary states such as Germany and Spain, it proposes concrete mechanisms for regions to raise and retain a greater proportion of their own taxes, thereby gaining genuine control over their budgets and fostering a direct social contract with their taxpayers. The transfer of significant legislative powers over industrial and economic strategy, environmental stewardship, infrastructure development, and tailored public services would enable Yorkshire to align policies with its unique strengths and needs. This shift from delegated functions to inherent competencies would provide the stability and ownership necessary for long-term regional development.

Reclaiming Yorkshire’s future is not merely an aspiration but a necessity for a more equitable and prosperous United Kingdom. This blueprint provides a practical, academically rigorous framework for achieving true local power, fostering economic prosperity, enhancing social equity, and cultivating a more robust, responsive, and legitimate democracy across the region. The transformation proposed is ambitious but essential, offering a path for Yorkshire to become a vibrant model of decentralized governance, where decisions are made closer to the people they affect, and local communities genuinely shape their own destinies, despite the aggressive and entrenched resistance from central government.

Sources

• Yorkshire Decentralization and Electoral Reform.pdf
• Parliament.uk, “Voting systems in the UK,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Unlock Democracy, “Six things we learned from the local elections,” May 8, 2025.
• Electoral Reform Society, “Imposing First Past the Post on these roles was a mistake,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Make Votes Matter, “First Past the Post,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, “First Past the Post – Disadvantages,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Electoral Reform Society, “How would proportional representation work in the UK?,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Electoral Reform Society, “English Local Elections,” June 2017.
• UK Election Data Vault, “Yorkshire and the Humber – Regional Analysis,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Parliament.uk, “Local elections 2025: Results and analysis,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Wikipedia, “Party-list proportional representation,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• FairVote, “Proportional Representation Voting Systems,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• University of Chicago, Center for Effective Government, “Proportional Representation,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Wikipedia, “Gerrymandering in the United States,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Wikipedia, “Single transferable vote,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Electoral Reform Society, “Single Transferable Vote,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Wikipedia, “Schulze method,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• ResearchGate, “The Schulze Method of Voting,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Wikipedia, “Schulze STV,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• UK Engage, “The Advantages and Disadvantages of Using A Proportional Representation Electoral System,” August 2013.
• House of Commons, “Single Transferrable Vote: an Electoral Reform Proposal Rebecca Stephen,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• NSW Parliament, “The rationale for bicameralism,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, “District Magnitude,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Tom Forth, “Bring on the NorthernPowerhouse,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Taylor & Francis Online, “Levelling up in a ‘decentralised’ England: place-based or ‘one-size-fits-all’ strategies?,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Wikipedia, “Levelling-up policy of the Conservative government,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• This is the Coast, “North Yorkshire Faces Significant Funding Cuts Amid Government Review Leaders Warn,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• UNISON National, “Cuts to local services,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Local Government Association, “Devolution deals,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• GOV.UK, “English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill: Guidance,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Wikipedia, “Combined authorities and combined county authorities,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• The Beverley Review, “Hull and East Yorkshire Take Control of £20 Million Transport Funding in Devolution Milestone,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Hull and East Yorkshire Combined Authority, “Local control of £20 million transport funding gets the green flag from Combined Authority board,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Institute for Government, “Labour’s devolution plans could mark the start of a generational shift in power,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• CoR (Committee of the Regions), “UK Fiscal Powers,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• GOV.UK, “Decentralisation – An assessment of progress,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Northern Powerhouse Partnership, “From Industrial Revolution to Northern Powerhouse: productivity in…”, February 2022.
• Britannica, “Devolution | History, Benefits & Challenges,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Wikipedia, “Federalism in Germany,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• European Union, CoR, “Germany Introduction,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Gesetze im Internet, “Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Britannica, “Spain – Autonomous Regions, Constitution, Monarchy,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Legislative Assembly of BC, “Federal and Provincial Jurisdictions,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Forum of Federations, “Canada – An Overview of Fiscal Arrangements,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Oxford Academic, “Fiscal Federalism in Practice: Canada and India,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• GOV.UK, “Decentralization in Sierra Leone: Impact, Constraints and Prospects,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Scioteca, CAF, “THE PILLARS OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Wikipedia, “Taxation in the United Kingdom,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Centre for Cities, “Where are we now: business rates devolution,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Stripe, “Navigating global tax compliance for retailers,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Export Development Canada (EDC), “Understanding international sales tax,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• International Monetary Fund (IMF), “Fiscal Decentralization in Spain,” November 2000.
• European Central Bank, “A fiscal capacity for the euro area: lessons from existing fiscal-federal systems,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• House.mn.gov, “Unicameral or Bicameral State Legislatures: The Policy Debate,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Europarl.europa.eu, “REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR INDUSTRIAL AREAS,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Sustainability-directory.com, “What Are the Policy Implications of Decentralization?,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• FAO.org, “Chapter 2. Decentralization and environmental issues,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Taylor & Francis Online, “Participatory governance in decentralized energy transition: long-term findings from a municipal case study in Germany,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Parliament.scot, “Devolved and Reserved Powers | Scottish Parliament Website,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Local Government Association, “The future of last-mile deliveries: Understanding the local perspective,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Federal Highway Administration, Department of Transportation, “The Transportation Planning Process Key Issues,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• a16z crypto, “6 use cases for Decentralized Physical Infrastructure (DePIN),” accessed August 6, 2025.
• European Commission, “European Digital Infrastructure Consortium – EDIC,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Wikipedia, “Public utility,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• White Rose eTheses Online, “REGIONAL AUTONOMY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• World Health Organization (WHO), “Governing Public Hospitals,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, “What is the experience of decentralized hospital governance in Europe?,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• PNHP.org, “Health Care Systems – Four Basic Models,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Swiss Medical Weekly, “A comparison of the United Kingdom’s and Switzerland’s healthcare financing systems for achieving equity and efficiency goals,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• ResearchGate, “Models of Healthcare in Developed and Developing Countries,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• NCBI, “Health Care Reform: The European Experience – Changing the Health Care System,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Institute for Education Policy, “The Right to Education: The European Model,” accessed August 6, 2025.
• Europarl.europa.eu, “The European Schools System: State of Play, Challenges and Perspectives,” accessed August 6, 2025.